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nature that language announces, a later case indicates that the dicta
in the O'Brien case will be given no such effect. Weiffenbach v. Seattle
was a suit by an employee of the Seattle Cornice Works to recover damages from the city on account of severe injuries suffered by plaintiff by
reason of the city's negligence.3 5 Within the scope of his employment,
at the time of the injury, plaintiff, while measuring the roof of a building, was injured by a current of electricity conveyed over a defectively
strung high voltage wire. The court decided that defendant was immune from a common law suit within the provisions of the 1929 amendment; and that the plaintiff's only recovery is from the insurance fund
established by the compensation act. As in the Everett case, the court's
conclusion that the injury is compensable is not based on any consideration that it is compensable because the result of a hazard inherent in
the plaintiff's employment.
Consideration of decisions reviewing the fundamental nature of the
Washington Workmen's Compensation Act has revealed that, as the
act itself indicates, the court has viewed the law as an industrial insurance statute imposing liability regardless of fault; and without regard
to a requirement that the injury "arise" from the employment. This
seems to be the decision of the court in the Stertz case. That rule, despite amendments of the act, has not been changed. No decision has
determined that the Washington act does not make compensable all injuries suffered in the course of the employment without more.
Therefore, the recent pronouncement of the Washington court in
Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, which
charged the cost experience of the employer for injuries and deaths
suffered by his employees, regardless of the fact that they were not the
result of a hazard inherent in the meat-packing industry, is consistent
with reason and decision. In so deciding, that court determined that
the Washington act is operative no matter what the cause of the injury,
or the hazard from which it resulted; but is, simply, where an employee
of an extrahazardous industry is injured in the course of his employment. Consequently, it is plain that the Boeing case; which eliminated
all element of fault from the operation of the Washington act, announces
a concept of workmen's compensation which imposes on employers, as
far as industrial injuries in extrahazardous industries are concerned, a
liability wholly without consideration of fault.
E. B. McGovERN.
A RECONCILIATION OF PRIORITIES UNDER EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND
Among the many complexities of modem business and financial
life none is fraught with more intricacies than the utilization of credit.
Economic exigencies have dictated that many must purchase without
the immediate ability to pay. The seller, likewise, has evidenced an eagerness to sell and transfer the possession of his property upon the
receipt of a promise that payment will be subsequently made at a specified date. Thus commerce thrives and the needs of the community are
satisfied. It is, however, necessary that the seller receive some further
assurance, some more reliable protection than the mere promise of the
-- 193 Wash. 528, 76 P. (2d) 589 (1938).
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buyer to pay, and it has been as the result of such a need that the various types of security devices have been conceived and have thrived.
Our present concern is with but one of these, namely the executory contract to buy and sell land. The scope of the treatment herein will be
limited to a narrow, but important phase of the general problem-the
rights of the vendee and those taking under him as against a creditor of
the vendor who, subsequent to the initial transaction, obtains a judgment lien upon all of the debtor's property. The following apt hypothetical problem is illustrative of the questions which may and often do
arise.
A contracts to convey Blackacre to B for $15,000. B pays A $5,000
and takes possession, the agreement being that the remaining $10,000
will be paid within two years and that A will then give B a warranty
deed. B records the contract' and subsequently executes a mortgage on
Blackacre to C as security for a loan from C of $8,000. Shortly thereafter E, a creditor of A's, obtains a judgment against A which was duly
entered in the journal by the clerk,2 thus becoming from that time a lien
upon A's real property.' Neither B, the vendee, nor C, B's mortgagee,
have actual knowledge of Es judgment lien. B continues to pay A the
unpaid portion of the purchase price and having complied with the
terms of the contract within the prescribed two-year period, is given a
warranty deed by A. C brings an action to foreclose his mortgage, the
$8,000 debt having been unpaid, and E comes in, contending that he has
a better right against the property by virtue of his judgment lien to the
extent of $10,000, which was the amount of his judgment and the
portion of the purchase price which B had not yet paid A at the time
the judgment was entered.
This fact situation presents several interesting problems, none of
which have been definitively answered by the Washington court. First,
let us consider the rights of the vendee as against the judgment creditor
of the vendor. At common law the judgment of a creditor was not a
lien upon the debtor's property." This undesirable situation was first
remedied by the British Parliament, 5 and subsequently all of the United
States, including Washington, have provided for statutory judgment
liens.
That the judgment creditor has a lien upon the legal title remaining
in the vendor is well settled in the majority of jurisdiction§. There
I Recordation of executory contracts for the sale or purchase of real
property is authorized by REm. REv. STAT. § 10596-3.
28 See Rmv. REv. STAT § 435.
RENL REv STAT. § 445 provides that the real estate of a judgment debtor
shall be subject to a lien of the judgment creditor to run for a period of
six years from the date the judgment is rendered. REm REv. STAT. § 445-1
states that the judgment lien shall commence from the date of entry, where
the real estate affected is situated in the county in which the judgment was
rendered.
' BLAcx, A TREATISE ON THE LAw or JuD~mEm~s (1902) § 397. The author
states that the sale instance at common law in which a lien was acquired
upon land by a judgment was where the debt was owned the King.
Statute of Westminster 2d, 13 Edward I, c. 18.
8

See supra n. 3.

Searle v. Bird, 94 Wash. 21, 161 Pac. 838 (1918); Heath v. Dodson, I
Wn. (2d) 667, 110 P. (2d) 845 (1941); May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 Pac. 454,
16 Ann. Cas. 1129 (1908); McDonald v. Curtis, 119 Wash. 384, 205 Pac. 1041
(1922) (Dictum).
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are, however, a few jurisdictions which hold that a judgment creditor
acquires no lien on the property of the debtor where he has entered into

an executory contract to sell the land.8 Most courts taking the position
last mentioned limit its application to those cases where the vendee

was in physical possession of the property at the time the judgment was
entered. 9 One learned author has stated the law on this question to be
that:10
"The legal title of a vendor who has not yet executed a con-

veyance is subject to the lien of a judgment against him to
the extent of the purchase money still unpaid, that is, the lien
binds the land so far as the rights of the vendee will not be
affected thereby. If all the purchase money has been paid,

the vendor has merely a bare legal title, which is not subject
to the lien, and if part only, or none has been paid, the

vendor's title is, by the weight of authority, subject to the
lien . . ."
The small number of courts applying the minority rule follow an ex-

tremely strict construction of the doctrine of equitable conversion, the
rationale being that since the equitable title in the land passes to the
vendee upon the execution of the contract by the vendor to sell the
land, the vendor has nothing but a bare legal title which he holds in
trust for the vendee, and in consequence there is no interest to which
the judgment creditor's lien can attach even though the vendee has
paid none of the purchase price at the time of the entry of the judgment."' It would follow under such a rule that the vendee could safely
pay the purchase price to the vendor even though he had actual knowledge of the existence of the judgment. That the result is not one to be
commended seems reasonably apparent.
Where the vendee has actual knowledge of the judgment lien the
courts hold with unusual unanimity that the vendee must pay the unpaid portion of the purchase price to the judgment creditor to the
extent of the lien . 2 The Arkansas court has, however, taken a contrary
view, holding that where the vendee made payments after having had
actual knowledge of the judgment, he nevertheless took the entire
property free of the lien.' 3 The precise problem has been treated in
Washington in the recent case of Heath v. Dodson,'4 but by indulging
in somewhat ambiguous language the court created, considerable doubt
as to the exact rule in this state. The vendee admittedly had actual
notice of the judgment lien at the time he made the controverted payments to the vendor, but the court in one place uses terminology which
would indicate that mere notice, constructive as well as actual, would
8Bain v. Pitfield, 26 Man. 89, 28 Dom. L: R. 206 (1916); 33 WEST L. R. 681
9 West Wkly 1163; Montreal Bank v. Condon, 11 Man. 366.
EState Bank v. Sanders, 114 Ark. 440, 170 S. W. 86 (1914); Lynch v.
Eifler, 191 Ill. A. 344 (1915); Cumning v. First Natl. Bank, 199 Iowa 667, 202
N. W. 556 (1925). For an excellent discussion of the basis of this conflict see
Reid v. Gorman, 37 S. D. 314, 158 N. W. 780 (1916).
10 5 TIFFANY, A TaSATISE ON TE LAw Or REAL Psormmy (3d ed. 1939) pp.
708-9..
llCaltride" v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 AtL 455, 87 A. L. R. 1500 (1931).
May v. Emerson, supra n. 7.

State Bank v. Sanders, supra'n. 9.
17

Wn. (2d) 667, 110 P.(2d) 845 (1941).
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be a basis for the same result. 15 There can be no question but that the
court correctly predicated its decision upon the fact that the vendee
made these payments with knowledge of the judgment lien, 6 but it is
urged that it should have left no doubt that where the vendee in possession has only constructive notice of the judgment lien, he is entitled to continue making payments of the unpaid portion of the purchase price to the vendor..' The weight of authority supports such a
position, 18 but it should be noted that many jurisdictions have yet to
consider this particular point, and at least one jurisdiction has held the
docketing of the judgment binds the vendee, the theory being that he
stands in the shoes of the vendor and consequently has imposed upon
him the duty to search the records before making payments on the
contract. 19 The reason for the majority rule has been aptly set forth
by a distinguished authority as follows:20
".. . it is well settled that the latter (vendee), if in possession
of the land sold, is not bound to ascertain, before making each
payment, that no judgment has been obtained against his
vendor. Whoever takes and keeps possession of land, by these
acts of ownership, gives such notice of his rights to the whole
world that no one can safely assume to act in ignorance of
them..

. . The docketing of a judgment . . . while he is in

possession of the land, is not notice to him of the charge
thereby created on the purchase money remaining unpaid. He
may, therefore, from time to time, pay to his vendor such
sums as fall due; and he will always be entitled to the benefit
of such payments, unless it can be shown that they were made
with the actual knowledge of a lien on the vendor's interest in
11In p. 672 the court says, "The interest of the Denmans (vendors) in
the real property they contracted to sell to the Vaughns is bound by the
lien of Dodson's judgment of January, 1937, against the Denmans to the
extent the contract was unexecuted. The lien of that judgment against the
Denmans was enforceable by the judgment creditor against the vendees
with notice as to all sums remaining unpaid by the vendees upon the contract." (Italics supplied.)
10In p. 673, the court states, "If the vendee with actual notice of the
judgment pays the remainder of the purchase money to the original vendor or assignee of the original vendor, and payment is not valid as against
the judgment creditors' lien on the land." (Italics supplied.) The statement
of the court that the rule is equally applicable to payments made to assignees of the vendor raises another interesting question not decided by that
case. Some courts have held, where the question has been adjudicated, that
an assignment by the vendor prior to the entry of the judgment divests him
of all interest in the land so that there is nothing upon which the judgment lien can attach. This is said to be true even though the assignment
was to the vendee as payment of a debt owed by the vendor to the vendee.
It would follow that under such a situation the vendee could not be required to pay the remainder of the purchase price to the vendor's judgment creditor, there being no lien to satisfy.
17 Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N. Y. 180 (1855); Filley v. Duncan, 1 Neb. 134, 93
Am. Dec. 337 (1871) (dictum); Baldwin v. Thompson, 15 Iowa 504 (1864),
where the court held that a vendee must have actual notice of the judgment
lien in order to be bound thereby; When v. Tall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N. W. 13, 70
Am. St. Rep. 397 (1898), ruling that docketing of the judgment is not constructive notice to the vendee.
12 F=AN oir JuDMENim (5th ed. 1925) pp. 2029-2030; 87 A. L. R. 1515;
1 BLcx ON JUDGMENTs (2d ed. 1902) p. 684.

10 M'Mullen v. Wenner, 16 Serg & R. (Pa.) 18, 16 Am. Dec. 543 (1827).
202 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS, supra n. 18.
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the land. This construction of the law seems to have been dictated by a consideration of the hardship to be inflicted on the
vendee in possession by establishing a different rule."
Tiffany states that the judgment lien is liable to be divested of whatever remains due the vendor by the vendee."' Although there is a
paucity of authorities on the subject, it would seem that if the vendee
is not in possession of the property, the docketing of the judgment is
constructive notice to him of the lien and he pays the vendor at his
peril.
The rule in the great majority of jurisdictions and the one which
should be adopted in Washington when the court is confronted with
the problem is, therefore, that if the vendee in possession under an
executory contract does not have actual notice of the judgment lien
against the interest of the vendor, payments made by him to the vendor
vest in him a good legal title to the land which is divested of the judg22
ment lien and hence is not subject to attack by the judgment creditor.
A recent Minnesota case held that if the property is not in the name of
the vendor at the time of the entry of the judgment, the rights of the
judgment creditor and his lien are subordinate to the rights of the
vendee who has possession under an executory contract for a deed, even
though none of the purchase price had been paid at the time the judgment was docketed.23 It follows, then, that both upon authority and
principle, B, the vendee in our hypothetical case, having paid the remainder of the purchase price to the vendor without actual notice of
the judgment lien of E, has both the legal and equitable title in Blackacre and his interest therein cannot be contested by E.
With regard to the status of the mortgagee, C, a somewhat more complex problem is presented, a problem upon the particular point of
which the cases are presently silent. That the vendee of real property
title is clear. 24
under an executory contract can mortgage his equitable
25
be:
to
rule
the
The Washington court has stated
. ..we find it to be well settled, that a vendee in possession
of property under a contract of sale has an interest which can
be conveyed or mortgaged. .21
Tn FANY, supra n. 10.
22Woodward v. Dean, 46 Iowa 499 (1877); Rogers v. Hussey, 36 Iowa 664
(1873); Baldwin v. Thompson, 15 Iowa 504 (1864); Hampson v. Edelen, 2
Harr. & J. 64, 34 Am. Dec. 530 (1806); Berryhill v. Potter, 42 Minn. 279, 44 N.
W. 251 (1890); When v. Tall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N. W. 13, 70 Am. St. Rep. 397
(1898); Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N. Y. 180 (1855); May v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262,
96 Pac.454, 16 Ann. Cas. 1129 (1908); 17 COL. L. REV. 47, "But as it would be
manifestly unjust to compel the vendee to watch the records for entries of
judgments or execution sales against his vendor, it is held in most jurisdictions that the vendee is entitled to the benefit of all payments made to his
vendor
prior to actual notice of the judgment lien or sale on execution."
23
Roberts v. Friedall, 15 N. W. (2d) 496 (1944).
2
1Titcomb v. Fondu, J. & G. R Co., 78 N. Y. S. 226, 38 Miss. Rep. 630
(1902); Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Ore. 473, 210 Pac. 167, 34 A. L. R. 1315
(1922); Harris v. Zeuch, 103 Fla. 183, 137 So. 135 (1931).
25Scott v. Farnam, 55 Wash. 336, 104 Pac. 639 (1909).
28At first blush it might appear that this result is presently forestalled in
Washington by the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29
(1925) where the court said that an executory contract for the sale and
purchase of land created no equitable or legal title in the vendee. That
case, however, on its facts was limited in its scope as to where the loss by
fire should fall, and the court has not been disposed to extend the concept.
215
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One court has gone to the extreme of saying that the want of title or
possession by the mortgagor does not render the mortgage void.27 The
correct statement of the rule, however, is that any interest in real
estate which is subject to sale or assignment can be mortgaged, but the
mortgagor must have some interest in the land upon which he is purporting to execute the mortgage..28 The mortgage by the vendee is valid
even though the contract to purchase has not been recorded at the time
the mortgage is executed.2 9 A contract for an option to purchase land
creates a mortgageable interest in the person holding the option.30 The
efficacy of the mortgage is dependent upon the subsequent performance
by the vendee of the contract to purchase, and a default by the purchaser defeats the mortgagee's security."' However, it appears that the
mortgagee has the right to complete the purchase if the mortgagor-vendee fails to perform his contract with the vendor,32 and recordation of
the mortgage is notice to subsequent purchasers of such right.
Since at the time of the execution of the mortgage the vendee had
only an equitable title to the land, the mortgagee acquires no more
than an equitable mortgage," or, in the words of the Washington court,
"a mortgage by the vendee operates as an equitable assignment of his
interest in the property."3 4 This, of course, follows from the rule that
a mortgage passes the interest of the mortgagor whatever it may be."3
The rationale is comparable to that used in cases concerning mortgages
of property to be subsequently acquired, equity viewing the transaction
as an implied contract to mortgage the property when the mortgagor
acquires the legal title, the result being predicated upon the maxim that
"equity regards that as done which ought to be done." 36
Upon completion of the purchase contract by the vendee and the
consequent acquisition by him of the legal title, the legal title inures to
the benefit of the mortgagee.37 With this principle the Washington
court is in complete accord, as indicated by the discussion of the
For two excellent comments on Ashford v. Reese, supra, see Lantz, Rights
of Vendees Under Executory Contracts of Sale, (1928) 3 WASH. L. REv. 1,
and Schweppe, The New Forfeiture Clause Test in. Executory Contracts
for the Sale of Land (1928) 3 WASH L. RI-v. 80.
2-, Grasswick v. Miller, 82 Mont. 364, 267 Pac. 299 (1928).
" 1 JONES, A T
.EA~rss
oN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 190.
21 Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N. D. 638, 147 N. W. 804 (1914).
30 Tenvoorde v. Tenvoorde, 128 Minn. 126, 150 N. W. 396 (1915); Minnesota Building and Loan Ass'n v. Closs, et al., 182 Minn. 452, 234 N. W. 872
(1931); 1 JoNEs, supra n. 28.
31 Sheehan v. McKinstry, supra n. 24.
32
Scott v. Farnam, supra n. 25.
3
5 Tenvoorde v. Tenvoorde, supra n. 30.
",Scott v. Farnam, supra n. 25.
151 JoNEs, supra n. 28, § 192.
36 For an exhaustive treatment of the law with respect to after acquired
property clauses see David Cohen and Albert B., Gerber, The After Acquired Property Clause (1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 635. Also Win. Walsh,
Mortgages of Property To Be Subsequently Acquired (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L.
Q. Ruv. 311.
37
Yellow Chiefs Coal Co.'s Trustee v. Johnson et al., 166 Ky. 663, 179
S. W. 599 (1915), where X held an option to purphase certain land and executed a mortgage to Y prior to the actual purchase thereof, the court held
the mortgage was valid and that the title subsequently acquired by the
mortgagor inured to the benefit of the mortgagee. See 1 JONES, supra n. 28,
§ 192.
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point in American Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Helgesen'8 where the
question was in issue and in which the court said:
It appears that when Erickson and wife executed the DeWees
mortgage and this new mortgage on the land, they had not
acquired legal title thereto. At that time they held the land
under a contract to purchase, having paid only a part of
the purchase price therefor. Thereafter they completed payment of the purchase price and received a deed vesting in them
full legal title. It is insisted that the mortgage could in no
event be any more than a charge upon the equitable interest
in the land possessed by Erickson and wife at the time of its
execution. This involves the question of whether the after
acquired title of Erickson and wife inured to the benefit of the
holder of the mortgage. . .. It is quite clear from the provisions of RIm. &BAL. CODE § 8765, that under such a deed
an after acquired title by the grantor inures to the" benefit of
the grantee. Under our decisions, the same rule applies as between mortgagor and mortgagee.
This is analogous to the situation where the grantee'takes property
subsequently acquired by the grantor which the latter had purported to
convey prior to the time he had the title.39 Likewise where the vendeemortgagor assigns his rights under the contract to purchase the land
to one having either actual or constructive notice of the pre-existing
mortgage, the title accrues to the benefit of the mortgagee upon payment by the assignee of the unpaid portion of the purchase price within
the stipulated time.40
In considering the respective rights of the judgment creditor and the
mortgagee of the vendee we are dealing with the conflicting claims of
alleged lienors as to the same property. The judgment creditor acquires
no better interest in or title to the land than his judgment debtor had
at the time the judgment lien attached thereto." 1 It is equally apparent
that he can have no better right against the mortgagee of the property
than he would have against the vendee-mortgagor. It is a fundamental
precept of equity jurisprudence that prior equitable interests in rem are
preferred to the general statutory lien of judgments subsequently
docketed, and this is true although the judgment lien is of a legal3
nature. 2 In a leading text on the subject the rule is stated to be:'
The equitable doctrine is, that a judgment and the legal lien
of its docket binds only the actual interest of the judgment
debtor, and is subject to all existing equities which are valid
as against such debtor.
This rule is equally applicable even though the mortgage was unrecorded at the time the judgment lien attached to the property, and the
Washington court has so held in the well reasoned case of Dawson v.
*864 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 390 (1911). Affirmed on rehearing in 67, Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 390. See also
Osborn v. Scottish American Co., 22 Wash. 83, 66 Pac. 49 (1900); Weber v.
Laidler, 22 Wash. 83,'66 Pac. 400, 90 Am. St. Rep. 726 (1901); Peoples Savings Bank v. Lewis, 37 Wash. 344, 79 Pac. 932 (1905); Gough v. Center, 57
Wash. 276, 106 Pac. 774 (1910).
'Bradley v. Fackler, 13 Wn. (2d) 614, 126 P. (2d) 190 (1942).
'0 Bull v. Shepharjd, 7 Wisc. 449 (1858).
•Simmon v. Clark,. 151 Kas. 431, 99 P. (2d) 739 (1940).
432 PommoY, A TasAnsE or Equy JuaisRmuDExEC (5th ed. 1941) § 721.

43 Supra n 42.
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McCarty.4 The essential facts in that case were that X, being indebted
to Y, executed a mortgage on Whiteacre as security for the debt in
consideration of an extension thereof. Y failed to record the mortgage
and in the interim Z, a prior creditor of X, filed a suit and obtained a
judgment, having neither actual or constructive notice of Y's mortgage
lien. In an action by Y to foreclose the court held that his lien as
mortgagee was superior to that of Z, the judgment creditor. This case
still represents the law in Washington and is founded upon the doctrine
that a judgment creditor is not a bona fide purchaser for value.45 As
the Washington statute applicable to the recordation of a mortgage of
real estate46 distinctly states that mortgages not recorded in accordance
with the provisions therein are void as against "subsequent purchasers
or mortgagees in good faith and for valuable consideration," it is scarcely
to be questioned that the rule as applied in Washington is sound both
upon principle and by statutory construction.
There is, however, a conflict as to the right of the mortgagee of an
unrecorded mortgage as against a subsequent judgment creditor, with
many courts holding contrary to the rule as stated above and followed
in Washington.4 But it is significant that in most of the states so holding, the recording statutes are worded so as to expressly include judgment creditors within their protection. Where courts have favored the
judgment creditor in the absence of a statutory mandate they must be
considered as having, in this respect, at least, intentionally repudiated
the aforementioned equitable doctrine. 48 It would, however, seem that
even in those states where the majority concept prevails, the judgment
creditor in our hypothetical situation could not succeed as against the
mortgagee of the vendee, although the mortgage was unrecorded, because the lien has been lifted from the property at the time the legal
title vests in the vendee-mortgagor, leaving no interest therein to which
the lien of the judgment creditor can attach. To hold otherwise would
be to give the judgment creditor a superior right against the vendee's
mortgagee than he had against the property in the hands of the vendee.
It is submitted, therefore, that C, the mortgagee of B, the vendee
in possession of Blackacre under an executory contract to purchase and
who has paid the remainder of the purchase price to A, the vendor, without actual knowledge that a judgment lien has been docketed by E,
the judgment creditor of A, should succeed in an action to foreclose the
mortgage even as against an intervention by E, the latter being precluded from claiming any interest in or lien upon Blackacre by virtue
of A having been divested of all interest, both legal and equitable,
DONALD R. COLVIN.
therein.
421 Wash. 314, 57 Pac. 816, 75 Am. St. Rep. 841 (1889). In accord see
Oklahoma State Bank v. Burnett, 65 Old. 74, 162 Pac. 1124, 4 A. L. R. 430
(1917).
"5 Lee v. Wrixon, 37 Wash. 47, 79 Pac. 489 (1905), wherein the court said,
"A creditor who acquires title to his debtor's real property by attachment
and sale on execution is not, in this state, a bona fide purchaser. He parts
with no consideration on account of his purchase and consequently takes
only such interest as his debtor has therein." See also Hacker v. White, 22
Wash. 415, 60 Pac. 114, 79 Am. St. Rep. 945 (1900).
"7 Rmw. Rxv. STAT. § 10596-1 et. seq.
4 Gulley v. Thurston, 112 N. C. 192, 17 S. E. 13 (1893), where the court
held that a judgment lies docketed prior to the recordation of a mortgage,
but subsequent to its execution, was a prior lien. For a discussion of both
the majority and minority rules see 4 A. L. R. 434.
Is 2 Pomismoy, supra n. 42, § 722.

